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Abstract
Walrasian prices, if they exist, have the property that one can assign every buyer some bundle
in her demand set, such that the resulting assignment will maximize social welfare. Unfortu-
nately, this assumes carefully breaking ties amongst different bundles in the buyer demand set.
Presumably, the shopkeeper cleverly convinces the buyer to break ties in a manner consistent
with maximizing social welfare. Lacking such a shopkeeper, if buyers arrive sequentially and
simply choose some arbitrary bundle in their demand set, the social welfare may be arbitrarily
bad. In the context of matching markets, we show how to compute dynamic prices, based upon
the current inventory, that guarantee that social welfare is maximized. Such prices are set with-
out knowing the identity of the next buyer to arrive. We also show that this is impossible in
general (e.g., for coverage valuations), but consider other scenarios where this can be done. We
further extend our results to Bayesian and bounded rationality models.
1 Introduction
A remarkable property of Walrasian pricing is that it is possible to match buyers to bundles, such
that every buyer gets a bundle in her demand set (i.e., a set of items S maximizing vipSq´řjPS pj),
and the resulting allocation maximizes the social welfare,
ř
i vipSiq (Si being the bundle allocated
to buyer i). However, Walrasian prices cannot coordinate the market alone; it is critical that ties
be broken appropriately, in a coordinated fashion.
Consider the following scenario: two items, a and b, and two unit demand buyers, Alice and
Bob. Alice has value R " 1 for item a and value one for item b, Bob has value one for each of the
two items a and b. There are many Walrasian pricings in this setting, for example a price of R´ 1
for item a and 0 for item b. Indeed, assigning item a to Alice and item b to Bob under these prices
maximizes simultaneously the individual utility of each buyer and the social welfare.
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However, in real markets, buyers often arrive sequentially, in some unknown order, and get no
guidance as to how to break ties. For these prices, (ppaq “ R´ 1 and ppbq “ 0), if Bob arrives first
then he will indeed choose item b, leaving item a for Alice to purchase, resulting in a social welfare
maximizing allocation. If, however, Alice arrives first, she has equal utility (“ 1) for both a and b
and may select item b, so Bob will walk away without purchasing any item, which results in social
welfare 1, compared with the optimal social welfare of R` 1. We furthermore remark that setting
prices of ppaq “ R and ppbq “ 1, which are also Walrasian prices, could result in both Alice and
Bob walking away, and resulting in zero social welfare.
One may suspect that we choose the wrong Walrasian pricing. It is known that in matching
markets the minimal Walrasian prices coincide with VCG payments [22], and they are also the
outcome of natural ascending auctions for matching markets [4]. In this example the minimal
Walrasian prices are to charge zero for both item a and item b. Indeed, if Alice arrives first, she
will choose item a, and when Bob arrives he will choose item b, and this is the social welfare
maximizing allocation. However, if Bob arrives first, he will be indifferent between the two items
and may choose item a — again — this achieves a social welfare of 2 compared with the optimal
social welfare of R ` 1. In fact, one can show that minimal Walrasian prices always induce ties in
demand [16]. Moreover, there exist markets that admit unique Walrasian prices, yet may achieve
zero welfare. For example, consider a single item valued at 1 by both Alice and Bob. The unique
Walrasian price is 1, which may result in both buyers walking away without purchasing the item.
In fact, we can show that no static prices (and thus no Walrasian prices) can give more than 2/3
of the social welfare for buyers that arrive sequentially. Consider unit demand buyers Alice, Bob,
and Carl, and items a, b, and c. Alice values a and b at one, and has zero value for c; symmetrically,
Bob values b and c at one and a at zero, and Carl values c and a at one, and b at zero. We term
such unit-demand valuations, where all individual values are either 0 or 1, binary unit-demand
valuations. A two line proof shows that no static pricing scheme, ppaq, ppbq, and ppcq can achieve
more than 2/3 of the optimal social welfare for this valuation profile. Assume all prices are strictly
less than one, and assume, without loss of generality, that ppaq ě ppbq ě ppcq. Now, Alice arrives
and chooses item b, Carl arrives and chooses item c, and finally Bob arrives — but there are no
items left for which Bob has a non zero valuation. Note that if ppaq ě 1 then item a will not be
sold as whomever is to buy it may decide simply to walk away, the same holds for items b and c so
assuming that all prices are strictly less than one holds without loss of generality, given that one
assumes that the prices achieve ě 2{3 of the optimal social welfare.
However, consider the following twist, which changes the prices after the first buyer arrives. In
the scenario above, when Alice arrives first and chooses (without loss of generality) item a, change
the prices so that Bob will choose b and Carl will choose c. This is easily done by setting new prices
p1pbq ă p1pcq. Irrespective of whomever arrives after Alice, the prices will ensure that all items get
sold and social welfare be maximized.
Obtaining optimal social welfare is trivial via dynamic pricing if the pricing mechanism knew
which buyer was to arrive next. The dynamic pricing mechanism could make use of infinite prices
to reduce the choices available to incoming buyer so that only a bundle consistent with optimal
social welfare can be selected. The key difficulty arises because the prices need to be set before the
preferences of the next buyer to arrive are known.
Thus, this paper studies the issues of static and dynamic pricing for sequentially arriving buyers.
Our main result is the following:
Main Theorem: For any matching market (i.e., unit demand valuations), we give a poly-time
dynamic pricing scheme that achieves the optimal social welfare, for any arrival order and irrespec-
tive of any tie breaking chosen by the buyers. We give a combinatorial algorithm to compute such
prices1.
We show that the existence of Walrasian prices does not, by itself, imply that there exist
dynamic pricing schemes that optimize social welfare. In particular, we give an example (Section
4.2) of a market with coverage valuations (a strict subclass of submodular valuations), which has
a unique optimal solution, and where Walrasian prices do exist, and yet no pricing scheme (static
or dynamic) can get the optimal social welfare.
We offer some remedies for this impossibility result.
• We show that a market with gross substitutes valuations that has a unique optimal allocation
always admits a static item pricing scheme that achieves the optimal welfare (Section 4.1).
• Moreover, while full efficiency is in general impossible, we argue that for any profile of valu-
ations, there exists a static pricing scheme that achieves at least a half of the optimal social
welfare. This result can be viewed as a generalization of the Combinatorial Walrasian Equi-
librium of [11]. In fact we adapt the static bundle prices computed in [12] for Bayesian agents
to achieve the one half guarantee of the optimal social welfare, for any class of valuations.
• We identify additional classes of valuations that admit dynamic pricing schemes that obtain
the optimal social welfare: (1) where buyer i seeks up to ki items, and valuations depend on
the item, and (2) for superadditive valuations.
The following remark is in order. Gross substitutes valuations are known to be the frontier for
the guaranteed existence of a Walrasian equilibrium [13]. They are also the frontier with respect
to computational tractability [27]: one can compute the allocation that maximizes social welfare
in polynomial time. The following open problem emerges from our work: are gross substitutes
valuations also the frontier for achieving optimal welfare via a dynamic pricing scheme? In other
words: Does every market with gross substitutes valuations admit a dynamic pricing scheme that
achieves optimal social welfare?
An additional problem that remains open concerns the power of static pricing. As stated above,
no static prices can give more than 2/3 of the optimal social welfare, even in the case of unit-demand
buyers. On the other hand, it is known that there exist static prices that achieve at least a half
of the optimal social welfare, even in the case of submodular (or XOS) valuations, and even in a
Bayesian setting [12]. While 1/2 has been shown to be tight for Bayesian settings, the negative
example does not carry over to settings with full information. A natural open problem is therefore
closing the gap between 1/2 and 2/3 of the fraction of the optimal welfare that can be achieved
by static pricing in full information settings. This problem is open even for the class of binary
unit-demand valuations. Recently, it has been shown that static prices can achieve more than a
0.51 fraction of the optimal welfare in the case of binary unit-demand valuations [6], leaving a
gap between 0.51 and 2/3 for binary unit-demand valuations, and a gap between 1/2 and 2/3 for
general unit-demand valuations (and more general ones).
1We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer who pointed out that this result can also be obtained via an LP
formulation of the problem and using LP-duality.
1.1 Related Work
Walrasian equilibrium, where prices are such that optimal social welfare is achieved, and the market
clears, given appropriate tie-breaking of preferences in the demand set dates back to 1874 [29]. The
existence of Walrasian prices for matching markets and more generally for gross substitutes valua-
tions appears in [19, 13]. The efficiency guarantee for the minimal Walrasian prices was considered
in [16] for both matching markets and matroid based valuations.2 Interestingly, the question of
finding a Walrasian equilibrium without ties in the demand for the case of gross substitutes val-
uations with a unique optimum was also asked by [21] in the quite different context of efficiently
computing a Walrasian equilibrium given access to an aggregate demand oracle. For a survey on
gross substitutes valuations, see [20].
The use of pricing schemes in order to maximize welfare in combinatorial auctions was considered
by [12] where they show static item prices can obtain 1{2 of the optimal social welfare for buyers
arriving via a Bayesian process, with XOS valuations. This result was later extended and generalized
to a general framework of stochastic online welfare maximization by [5]. Improved bounds were
shown for both the Bayesian and full information case by [9] when the items are identical. The
question of whether static item prices can get more than half of the optimal welfare was tackled
by [6], where they showed that for binary unit-demand valuation, the answer is affirmative. The
use of bundle prices was considered by [11] in order to circumvent the impossibilities of achieving
Walrasian equilibrium when item prices are in use.
The performance of posted price mechanisms was also studied under the objective of maximizing
revenue in Bayesian settings. When a single item is for sale, [15] noticed that results in the prophet
inequalities settings translate to nearly optimal mechanism. [14] considered the question of finding
envy-free prices that simultaneously maximize revenue in the full information setting, and show a
logarithmic approximation for this objective for unit-demand and single-minded bidders. Since a
better approximation than to a polylog factor is impossible, [1] considered a Bayesian setting where
a single unit demand buyer is sampled from a product distribution over the items, and showed how
to price the items in order to get a constant factor approximation. The result was later extended
by [2] to multiple unit demand buyers using dynamically adjusted prices.
Dynamic posted prices were considered in a broader setting than auctions by [3], where they
show posted price mechanisms can achieve a nearly optimal competitive ratio for a host of cost
minimization problems. Lately, there has been a growing interest in analyzing the performance
of posted price mechanisms for various scheduling objectives such as makespan minimization [10],
maximum flow time minimization [17] and sum of weighted completion times minimization [8].
Our work is also related to the rich literature on online bipartite matching. The first work to
consider a similar setting was the seminal paper by [18] where side A of a bipartite graph is known
in advance, while the vertices in side B arrive sequentially, each vertex with its adjacent edges, and
the algorithm’s goal is to match each incoming vertex while maximizing the size of the matching.
[18] gave an optimal randomized 1´ 1{e approximation to the size of the matching. An analogy of
their algorithm to posted prices was given by [7]. For a broad overview of online matching problems
and results in this area, we refer to the survey in [23].
2The class of matroid based valuations are conjectured to be equivalent to the class of gross substitutes valuations
by [24].
1.2 Paper Structure
In Section 2 we describe our model, and define different types of markets and pricing schemes.
In Section 3 we present our main result, which is a dynamic pricing scheme that achieves the
optimal social welfare, irrespective of the order of agent arrival and the form in which agents break
ties.
In Section 4 we study markets that admit a unique optimal allocation. In Section 4.1 we show
that our main result can be extended to a market with gross substitutes valuations, if the optimal
allocation is unique. In particular, one can always compute static item prices that lead to optimal
welfare. These prices are Walrasian prices (but not any Walrasian prices). In Section 4.2 we
show that extending this result beyond gross substitutes valuations is not always possible, even
with dynamic prices. In particular, we show an example of a market with coverage valuations (a
subset of submodular valuations) that admits a unique optimal allocation, as well as a Walrasian
equilibrium, but where no dynamic prices can lead to optimal welfare.
In Section 5 we study the power of bundle prices. In Section 5.1 we show that if one allows to
assign prices to bundles (as opposed to items), then a half of the optimal social welfare can always
be achieved (i.e. for arbitrary monotone valuations), even with static prices. The construction of
prices uses ideas from [11, 12]. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we present two classes of valuations for
which static bundle prices can lead to optimal social welfare. These are super-additive valuations
and some variant of unit-demand valuations.
2 Model and Preliminaries
Our setting consists of a set I of m indivisible items and a set of n buyers that arrive sequentially
in some arbitrary order.
Each buyer has a valuation function vi : 2
I Ñ <ě0 that indicates her value for every set of
objects, and a buyer valuation profile is denoted by v “ pv1, . . . , vnq. We assume valuations are
monotone non-decreasing and normalized (i.e., vipHq “ 0). We use vipA|Bq “ vipA Y Bq ´ vipBq
to denote the marginal value of bundle A given bundle B. An allocation is a vector of disjoint sets
x “ px1, . . . , xnq, where xi denotes the bundle associated with buyer i P rns (note that it is not
required that all items are allocated). The social welfare (SW) of an allocation x is SWpx,vq “řn
i“1 vipxiq, and the optimal welfare is denoted by OPT(v). When clear from context we omit v
and write SWpxq and OPT for the social welfare and optimal welfare, respectively.
An item pricing is a function p : I Ñ <ě0 that assigns a price to every item. The price of item
j is denoted by ppjq. Given an item pricing, the utility that buyer i derives from a set of items S
is uipS,pq “ vipSq ´řjPS ppjq. The demand correspondence DipI,pq of buyer i contains the sets
of objects that maximize buyer i’s utility; i.e., DipI,pq “ argmaxSĎIuipS,pq.
A bundle pricing is a tuple pB,pq, where B “ tB1, . . . , Bku is a partition of the items into bundles
(where
Ť
iBi “ I and for every i ‰ j, Bi X Bj “ H), and p : B Ñ <ě0 is a function that assigns
a price to every bundle in B. The price of bundle Bj is denoted ppBjq. Given a bundle pricing
pB,pq, the utility that buyer i derives from a set of bundles S is uipS,pq “ vipSq ´řBjPS ppBjq.
The demand correspondence DipB,pq of buyer i contains the sets of bundles that maximize buyer
i’s utility; i.e., DipB,pq “ argmaxSĎBuipS,pq.
We consider several types of pricing schemes: static item pricing, dynamic item pricing, static
bundle pricing, and dynamic bundle pricing.
In static pricing schemes, prices are assigned (to items or bundles) initially, and never change
then. In contrast, in dynamic pricing schemes, new (item or bundle) pricing may be set before the
next buyer arrives. Item pricing schemes assign prices to items, whereas bundle pricing schemes
partition the items to bundles and assign prices to bundles that are elements of the partition. Thus,
the four types of pricing schemes are described as follows.
Static Item Pricing Scheme:
1. Item prices, p, are determined once and for all.
2. Buyers arrive in some arbitrary order, the next buyer to arrive chooses a bundle in her demand
set among the items not already allocated (and pays the sum of the corresponding prices).
Static Bundling Pricing Scheme:
1. Bundles, and their prices, pB,pq, are determined once and for all.
2. Buyers arrive in some arbitrary order, the next buyer to arrive chooses a set of bundles in her
demand set among the bundles not already allocated (and pays the sum of the corresponding
prices).
Dynamic Item Pricing Scheme:
• Before buyer t “ 1, . . . , n arrives (and after buyer t´ 1 departs, for t ą 1):
1. Item prices, pt, are set (or reset) before buyer t arrives, prices are set for those items
that have not been purchased yet.
2. When buyer t arrives she purchases a set of items S in her demand among the items not
already allocated (and pays the sum of the corresponding prices according to pt).
Dynamic Bundle Pricing Scheme:
• Before buyer t “ 1, . . . , n arrives (and after buyer t´ 1 departs, for t ą 1):
1. A partition into bundles and bundle prices, pB,ptq, is determined for the items that have
not been purchased yet.
2. When buyer t arrives she purchases a set of bundles S in her demand set among the
bundles on sale (and pays the sum of the corresponding prices according to pt).
We say that a pricing scheme achieves optimal (respectively, α-approximate) social welfare if
for any arrival order and any manner in which agents may break ties, the obtained social welfare
is optimal (resp., at least an α fraction of the optimal welfare).
2.1 Classes of Valuations
This paper introduces a host of dynamic and static pricing scheme for a variety of well studied
valuation classes. In the following, we formally define these classes.
Unit demand valuations: A unit demand valuation v : 2I Ñ <ě0 associates each item j P I
with a value vj , and values a bundle S Ď I by the maximum valued item in the bundle, that is,
vpSq “ maxjPS vj .
Gross substitutes valuations[19]: A valuation function vi is gross substitutes if for every price
vector p, a set S P DipI,pq and price vector p1 ě p, there exists some set of items T Ď I such that
tj P S : ppjq “ p1pjqu Y T P DipI,p1q.
Coverage valuations: A coverage valuation v is defined by a ground set E of elements, a weight
function on the elements w : E Ñ <ě0 and a mapping m : I Ñ 2E from items to sets of elements.
For a given set of items S, let ES “ Ť
jPS
mpjq be the set of elements covered by the items in S. The
value of S is vpSq “ ř
ePES
wpeq.
It is easy to see that every unit demand valuation is also gross substitutes and coverage. On the
other hand, there are gross substitutes valuations that are not coverage and vice versa. We also note
that both gross-substitutes and coverage valuations are strict subsets of submodular valuations.
Super-additive valuations: A valuation v is said to be super-additive if for every two disjoint
sets of items A,B Ď I, vpAYBq ě vpAq ` vpBq.
In Section 5.3 we extend our results to a less studied class of valuations which we term k-demand
item-dependent. We define the class formally in the corresponding section. We note that this class
is contained in the class of gross substitutes. It is not contained in and does not contain the class
of unit demand valuations.
3 Optimal Dynamic Pricing Scheme for Matching Markets
In this section we consider unit demand valuations (matching markets). Every agent seeks one item,
and may have different valuations for the different items. Whereas this setting admits Walrasian
prices, such prices are not applicable to the setting where agents arrive sequentially, in an unknown
order, and choose an arbitrary item in their demand set.
We now describe a dynamic item pricing scheme for matching markets that maximizes social
welfare — the sum of buyer valuations for their allocated items is maximized. The process we
consider is as follows:
• The valuations of the buyers are known.
• The buyers arrive in some arbitrary order unknown to the pricing scheme.
• Prices are posted, they may change after a buyer departs but cannot depend upon the next
buyer.
[Running example] To illustrate the process, we consider a running example of a match-
ing market, buyers Alice, Bob, Carl, and Dorothy, items a, b, c and d. The valuations
are given in Figure 2(a), where squares represent buyers, circles represent items, and
A,B,C,D stand for Alice, Bob, Carol and Dorothy. The minimal Walrasian pricing is
ppaq “ 1, ppbq “ 7, ppcq “ 7, ppdq “ 0. Under the minimal Walrasian pricing, or any static
pricing, unless ties are broken in a particular way, sequential arrival of buyers will not
produce optimal social welfare (as shown in the full version of the paper).
An example of the use of dynamic pricing that follows from our dynamic pricing scheme
is given in Figure 2. Every row represents a phase in the process, where a single buyer
arrives. The LHS graph in every row represents the valuations of the remaining buyers
and items, thick edges represent a maximum weight matching. The RHS graph represents
the graph of edges, upon which prices are calculated by Algorithm Price-Items. Directed
cycles of length 0 (if any) are represented by thick edges. The arriving buyers along with
the items they pick are specified in the right column.
The input consists of the graph G “ pN, I,vq. G is a complete bipartite weighted graph, where
N is the set of agents, I is the set of items, and for every agent a P N and item b P I, the weight of
an edge xa, by is the value that agent a gives item b, vapbq (va : I Ñ <ě0 is the valuation function
for agent a).
Without loss of generality, one may assume that in G we have that |I| ě |N |, otherwise, we add
dummy vertices to the I with zero weight edges to the vertices of the N side until |I| “ |N |. OPT
is the weight of the maximum weight matching in G (alternatively, the optimal social welfare). Let
M Ď N ˆ I be some matching in G, we define SWpMq “ řpa,bqPM vapbq to be a function that takes
a matching and returns the social welfare (value) of the matching.
We now continue to describe the dynamic pricing scheme. At time t P 0, . . . , |N | (after the t-th
agent departs), we define the following:
• Mt Ď N ˆ I is the partial matching consisting of a subset of the first t agents to arrive, and
the item of their choice, amongst the items available for sale upon arrival. The size of Mt
may be less than t. It can indeed be the case that not all buyers may be matched since their
demand set may be empty when they arrive.
• Nt Ď N and It Ď I are the first t agents to arrive and the items matched to them in the
matching Mt.
• Nąt “ NzNt and Iąt “ IzIt are the remaining agents (to arrive at some time ą t) and the
items remaining after the departure of the t-th agent. Define Gąt to be the graph G where
agents Nt and items It have been discarded. I.e., Gąt “ pNąt, Iąt,vq.
• We define pt`1 : Iąt Ñ <ě0 to be the prices set by the dynamic pricing scheme after the
departure of agent t (but before the arrival of agent t` 1).
To compute the function pt`1 we first construct a so-called “relation graph”, Rąt, and then perform
various computations upon it. The vertices of the relation graph are all items yet unsold, Iąt, the
edges and their weights are as follows:
1. Compute Mąt Ď Nąt ˆ Iąt, a maximum weight matching of the graph Gąt which matches
all vertices of Iąt.3 For every item b P Iąt, let vątpbq denote the value of item b to the agent
matched to item b in the matching Mąt.
3Note that such a maximum weight matching exists because initially |N | ď |I|, and since every agent takes at most
2. The edges of Rąt, denoted by Eąt, are a clique on the vertices Iąt, and their weights Wąt :
Eąt Ñ < are computed as follows: Let Mąt be a maximum weight matching of remaining
items and agents as defined above. For every pair pa, bq P Mąt, and for every b1 P Iątztbu
create an edge xb, b1y. The weight of the edge xb, b1y,
Wątpxb, b1yq “ vapbq ´ vapb1q. (1)
[Running example] The initial graph Gą0 of our running example is given in Figure
2(a), where a maximum weight matching Mą0 is indicated by thick edges. The graph Rą0
is given in Figure 2(b). For example, the weight of the edge xa, by is vAlicepaq´vAlicepbq “
´6.
We give the following structural property of Rąt:
Lemma 1. There are no directed cycles of negative weight in Rąt.
Proof: Assume there exists a negative cycle of length `. Assume the cycle is comprised of
xb1, b2y, xb2, b3y, . . . , xb`´1, b`y, xb`, b1y. This cycle corresponds to a cycle of alternating edges in Gąt
pb1, a1q pa1, b2q , pb2, a2q . . . pa`´1, b`q , pb`, a`q , pa`, b1q, where for every j P t1, . . . , `u, pbj , ajq P Mt
and paj , bj`1q RMt.
For ease of notation, we define ` ` 1 “ 1. According to the definition of weights in Rąt, we
know that ÿ`
j“1
Wątpxbj , bj`1yq “
ÿ`
j“1
`
vaj pbjq ´ vaj pbj`1q
˘ ă 0,
and therefore,
ř`
j“1 vaj pbj`1q ą
ř`
j“1 vaj pbjq. We get that the matching M 1, which is constructed
by removing the set tpbj , ajqujP1,...,` from Mąt and adding the set tpbj`1, ajqujP1,...,`, is of larger
weight, in contradiction to Mąt being a maximum weight matching.
We now process the relation graph Rąt:
1. Let ∆ be the smallest total weight of a cycle with strictly positive total weight in Rąt, and
let  “ ∆|Iąt|`1 . Mark all edges in Eąt that take part in some directed cycle of weight 0 in
Rąt. Delete all marked edges. Let E1ąt be the set of remaining edges. For every edge e P E1ąt,
set W 1ątpeq “Wątpeq ´ . Let R1ąt “ pIąt, E1ąt,W 1ątq be the resulting graph.
2. Set pt`1 “ p where p is the output of Price-Items (see Figure 1) with R1ąt as the input graph.
Since Price-Items uses shortest paths computation, we need R1ąt to have the following property.
Lemma 2. All the directed cycles in R1ąt are strictly positive.
Proof: Let rR be the graph which is obtained from Rąt by removing all the edges that take part
in a directed cycle of weight 0. Since according to Lemma 1, Rąt has no negative weight cycles,
all the cycles in rR are of strictly positive weight. By the definition of ∆, every simple cycle has
one item, |Nąt| ď |Iąt| continues to hold. Since all edge weights are non-negative, and Gąt is a complete bipartite
graph, every maximum weight matching can be extended to produce a matching with the same weight which matches
all of the vertices in Iąt.
Price-Items
Input: A directed graph G “ pI, E,W q where all cycles are strictly positive.
Output: a pricing function p : I Ñ <ě0 such that ppb1q´ppbq ě ´W pxb, b1yq for every xb, b1y P E.
1. Add a dummy node dum, and draw an edge of weight 0 from dum to every other node.
2. Compute the shortest path from dum to all nodes of G (there are no negative cycles in
G). For every b P I, let distdumpbq denote the length of the shortest path from dum to b.
3. For every item b P I, set ppbq “ ´distdumpbq.
Figure 1: Pricing algorithm.
a weight of at least ∆. R1ąt is constructed by taking rR and decreasing all the edge weights by
 “ ∆|Iąt|`1 . Therefore, the weight of every simple cycle in rR could have decreased by no more than
|Iąt|  ă ∆, which means that all the cycles in R1ąt are of strictly positive weight.
[Running example] In Figure 2(b), the thick edges form a directed cycle of weight 0.
We remove these edges and subtract  from every remaining edge. We then run Algorithm
Price-Items on the obtained graph, which gives the prices presented in red next to each
item in Figure 2(b). In this case, the only negative edge (after removing the cycle of
length 0) is the edge xd, ay, whose price is set to ´W 1pxd, ayq “ ´p´1´ q “ 1` . Since
all the other shortest paths are positive, prices of other items do not change (recall the
new price is the negation of the shortest path from the dummy item). When Alice arrives,
she picks the unique item in her demand set — item b. Similarly, graphs Gąt, Rąt of all
iterations t “ 0, 1, 2, 3 are demonstrated in Figure 2(c)-(h).
The following definition encompasses the properties needed by a pricing function in order to
get the optimal social welfare by dynamic pricing.
Definition 3.1 (good prices1). Let Wąt be a weight function as defined in Eq. (1), R1ąt “
pIąt, E1ąt,W 1ątq be a graph that’s a result of step 1 above. A pricing function p : Iąt Ñ <ě0 is
good (equivalently, prices are good) if the following three properties occur:
@b P Iąt ppbq ě 0 (2)
@xb1, b2y P E1ąt ppb1q ´ ppb2q ăWątpxb1, b2yq (3)
@b P Iąt : vątpbq ą 0 ppbq ă vątpbq (4)
Consider a directed edge xb1, b2y and some cycle it belongs to. The edge xb1, b2y came about
because we choose a maximal matching where item b1 was assigned to some buyer a, whereas b2 was
not. If all such cycles have strictly positive total weight, then the edge weights, and the associated
prices computed via Price-Items, ensure that agent a prefers b1 to b2, effectively removing choices
for “wrong” tie breaking. Contrawise, if the edge xb1, b2y does belong to some cycle of total weight
zero, this implies that the maximum matching is not unique. Ergo, whenever some item along this
cycle is first chosen, it is still possible to extend the matching to a maximal weight matching. This
is exactly where the dynamic pricing creeps in, subsequent to this symmetry breaking, new prices
have to be computed to avoid wrong tie breaking decisions.
Figure 2: An Illustration of our Running Example: Phases t “ 0, 1, 2, 3 of our running example.
Squares represent items and circles represent buyers. Every row represents a phase in the process,
where a single buyer arrives. On the left one sees the graph representing the valuations of the
remaining buyers and items (graphs labeled paq, pbq, pcq and pdq, where thick edges represent a
maximum weight matching in the graph. Graphs labeled pbq, pdq, pfq and phq give the graphs Rąt
from which the dynamic are computed. Directed cycles of length 0 (if any) are represented by
thick edges, after they are discarded, prices are computed via Algorithm Price-Items. On the very
right one sees the next buyer to arrive as well as the item she chooses (based upon the pricing, and
breaking ties for the sake of this example.
We now show that setting prices that satisfy the properties of good prices ensures that after
the arrival of all agents, the social welfare achieved is maximized.
Theorem 3.1. A dynamic pricing scheme which calculates prices that are good achieves optimal
social welfare (a maximum weight matching of G).
Proof: Recall that Mt is the matching which results from the first t P t0, 1, . . . , |N |u agents
taking an item which maximizes their utility and that Gąt is the graph of the remaining agents and
items after the first t agents arrived and purchased some items. Let Mąt be a maximum weight
matching of Gąt, where Mą0 is a matching that maximizes the social welfare of all the agents, and
Mą|N | “ H. We prove by induction that for every t P t0, 1, . . . , |N |u, SWpMtq`SWpMątq “ OPT .
It follows that the matching M|N | yields optimal social welfare.
For t “ 0, this claim trivially holds since SWpMą0q “ OPT . Assume that for some t ´ 1,
SWpMt´1q ` SWpMąt´1q “ OPT . Let Mąt be the maximum weight matching we compute at step
1. of the pricing scheme. When agent t arrives, consider the following cases:
• Agent t does not take any item. By property p4q, the only case where an agent has no
positive utility from any item is if she is matched to an item in Mt´1 with an edge of weight
0. In this case, SWpMtq “ SWpMt´1q, and by taking Mąt to be the same matching as
Mąt´1 without the edge the t-th agent is matched to, SWpMątq “ SWpMąt´1q. We get that
SWpMtq ` SWpMątq “ SWpMt´1q ` SWpMąt´1q “ OPT .
• Agent t takes the item which she is matched to in Mąt´1. Let v be the value of the t-th agent
for the item. Clearly, SWpMtq “ SWpMt´1q ` v. By taking Mąt to be the same matching as
Mąt´1 without the edge the t-th agent is matched to, we get SWpMątq “ SWpMąt´1q ´ v.
We get that SWpMtq ` SWpMątq “ SWpMt´1q ` v ` SWpMąt´1q ´ v “ OPT .
• Agent t “ a P Nąt´1 takes an item b1 P Iąt´1 which is different than b P Iąt´1, the item
which she is matched to in Mąt´1. Therefore,
vapb1q ´ pt´1pb1q ě vapbq ´ pt´1pbq. (5)
Let xb, b1y P Eąt´1 be the directed edge from b to b1 in Rąt´1. Its weight Wąt´1pxb, b1yq “
vapbq ´ vapb1q. If xb, b1y would have been in R1ąt´1, then according to property p3q, we would
have had that pt´1pbq ´ pt´1pb1q ă Wąt´1pxb, b1yq “ vapbq ´ vapb1q. Rearranging gives us
vapb1q ´ pt´1pb1q ă vapbq ´ pt´1pbq, which contradicts p5q. Therefore, xb, b1y was removed from
R1ąt´1, which can only happen if the edge is part of a directed cycle of weight 0 in Rąt´1.
Let b1 “ b``1 “ b, b2 “ b1 and let xb1, b2y, xb2, b3y, . . . , xb`´1, b`y, xb`, b``1 “ b1y be a simple
directed cycle of length ` and weight 0 in Rąt´1 in which xb, b1y takes part. This cycle
corresponds to a cycle of alternating edges in Gąt´1,
pb1 “ b, a1 “ aq
`
a1, b2 “ b1
˘
, pb2, a2q . . . pa`´1, b`q , pb`, a`q , pa`, b``1 “ b1q ,
where
pbj , ajq PMąt´1 and paj , bj`1q RMąt´1 for every j P t1, . . . , `u.
Since the directed cycle is of weight 0, we get that
ÿ`
j“1
Wątpxbj , bj`1yq “
ÿ`
j“1
`
vaj pbjq ´ vaj pbj`1q
˘ “ 0,
which means that the value of the unmatched edges in the directed cycle,
ř`
j“1 vaj pbj`1q, is
equal to the value of the matched edges,
ř`
j“1 vaj pbjq.
Let ĂMąt´1 be the matching which is a result of taking Mąt´1, removing the edges in the set
tpaj , bjqujPt1,...,`u, and adding the edges of tpbj`1, ajqujPt1,...,`u; Note that pa, b1q “ pa1, b2q PĂMąt´1. Since the edges we added to ĂMąt´1 are of the same value as the edges we removed,
SWpĂMąt´1q ` SWpMt´1q “ SWpMąt´1q ` SWpMt´1q “ OPT.
We define Mąt to be a matching comprised of the same edges as ĂMąt´1 except pa, b1q. There-
fore, SWpMątq “ SWpĂMąt´1q ´ vapb1q. Clearly, we have that SWpMtq “ SWpMt´1q ` vapb1q.
We get that SWpMątq ` SWpMtq “ SWpĂMąt´1q ´ vapb1q ` SWpMt´1q ` vapb1q “ OPT . This
completes the proof of the induction and the theorem.
It remains to show that Price-Items output prices that are good — i.e., prices that satisfies all
three properties in Definition 3.1. First, we observe that property p2q is trivially satisfied.
Observation 3.2. Price-Items computes prices which satisfy property p2q.
Proof: This follows since the length of the shortest path from dum to every node is at most the
length of the direct edge from dum to this node, i.e., 0.
The following property is helpful in proving property p3q.
Lemma 3. Let G “ pI, E,W q be the input graph of Price-Items and let p : I Ñ <ě0 be its output.
For every xb1, b2y P E we have that ppb2q ´ ppb1q ě ´W pxb1, b2yq.
Proof: Since the shortest path from dum to b2 is no longer than the shortest path from dum to
b1 plus the direct edge from b1 to b2, we have that
distdumpb2q ď distdumpb1q `W pxb1, b2yq.
Rearranging gives
ppb2q ´ ppb1q “ ´distdumpb2q ` distdumpb1q ě ´W pxb1, b2yq
as desired.
We can now establish that property p3q holds.
Lemma 4. Price-Items computes prices which satisfy property p3q.
Proof: By Lemma 3, we get that for a given xb1, b2y P E1ąt,
ppb2q ´ ppb1q ě ´W 1ątpxb1, b2yq “ ´pWątpxb1, b2yq ´ q.
Therefore,
ppb1q ´ ppb2q ďWątpxb1, b2yq ´  ăWątpxb1, b2yq,
as desired.
For any two items b, b1 P I, let distpb, b1q denote the length of the shortest path from b to b1 in
R1ąt. For establishing that property p4q is met by the prices ppbq’s computed by Price-Items, we
need the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let b` be some vertex with ppb`q ą 0, and let dum, b0, b1, . . . , b` be a shortest path from
the dummy node dum to b`. For every i P t0, 1, . . . , `u, ppbiq “ ´distpb0, biq.
Proof: Let bi a vertex on the shortest path from b0 to b`. Since every sub-path of a shortest
path is also a shortest path, it must be that dum, b0, . . . , bi is a shortest path from dum to bi, and
that distdumpbiq “ W pxdum, b0yq ` distpb0, biq “ distpb0, biq. Therefore, ppbiq “ ´distdumpbiq “
´distpb0, biq as desired.
We get the the following two corollaries.
Corollary 3.3. ppb0q “ 0.
Corollary 3.4. For every i P t0, 1, . . . , `´ 1u, ppbiq ´ ppbi`1q “Wątpxbi, bi`1yq ´ .
Proof: Since every sub-path of a shortest path is also a shortest path, we get that distpb0, bi`1q “
distpb0, biq `W 1ątpxbi, bi`1yq. From Lemma 5, we get that ppbiq “ ´distpb0, biq and
ppbi`1q “ ´distpb0, bi`1q
“ ´distpb0, biq ´W 1ątpxbi, bi`1yq
“ ppbiq ´ pWątpxbi, bi`1yq ´ q,
where the last equality follows by the definition of W 1ąt.
We now prove that property p4q is met.
Lemma 6. For every b P Iąt which is matched in Mąt by a non-zero weight edge, ppbq ă vątpbq.
Proof: Assume for the purpose of reaching a contradiction that there exists some b “ b` which is
matched in Mt via an edge of strictly positive weight for which ppbq ě vątpbq. Let dum, b0, b1, . . . , b`
be a shortest path from dum to b` in the graph processed in Price-Items. According to Corollary
3.4, for every i P t0, 1, . . . , `´ 1u, ppbiq ´ ppbi`1q “ Wątpxbi, bi`1yq ´ . Summing over all i’s gives
us
`´1ÿ
i“0
Wątpxbi, bi`1yq “ ppb0q ´ ppb`q ` ` ă ´ppbq `∆, (6)
where the inequality stems from the fact that ppb0q “ 0 (Corollary 3.3), b` “ b, ` ă |Iąt| and
 “ ∆|Iąt|`1 . Let a be the vertex that b is matched to in Mąt. According to the definitions of the
weights of edges in Rąt, we get that the weight of the edge xb, b0y P Et in Rąt is
Wątpxb`, b0yq “ vapbq ´ vapb0q ď vątpbq ď ppbq, (7)
where the first inequality is due to the definition of vątpbq, and the second inequality is due to our
initial assumption. Combining p6q with p7q yields that the weight of the cycle
xb0, b1y, xb1, b2y, . . . , xb`´1, b`y, xb`, b0y in Rąt is ř`i“0Wątpxbi, bi`1 mod ``1yq ă ∆. Since ∆ is the
minimal weight of a positive cycle in Rąt, we get that either the weight of the cycle is negative,
which contradicts Lemma 1, or the cycle is of weight 0, contradicting the fact the we delete every
edge that takes part in some cycle of weight 0 in Rąt from R1ąt.
4 Unique Optimum
In this section, we inspect the case where the social maximizing allocation is unique. We first show
that in this case, an optimal dynamic bundle-pricing scheme implies an optimal static bundle-pricing
scheme:
Observation 4.1. Let v “ pv1, . . . , vnq, where vi : 2I ÞÑ <ě0, and let xv, Iy be an instance where
B “ tB1, . . . , Bnu is the unique partition of items that maximizes social welfare. If there exists
an optimal dynamic bundle-pricing scheme, then there must exist an optimal static bundle-pricing
scheme.
Proof: Let p1 : B Ñ <ě0 be the initial prices the optimal dynamic pricing scheme gives to
the bundles. We claim that sticking to these prices throughout the process guarantees an optimal
allocation as well. Without loss of generality, assume that agents with lower index arrive earlier
and that the i-th agent to arrive is the first agent whose choice X ‰ tBiu (could be that X “ tBju,
j ‰ i, could be that x “ tBi, Bj , . . .u, j ‰ i, and could be that X “ H).
It must be the case that uipp1, Xq ě uipp1, Biq. Therefore, if this agent arrives first, she is
not guaranteed to take tBiu since this not the unique bundle that maximizes her utility. This
contradicts the optimality of the dynamic pricing scheme.
4.1 Optimal Welfare for Gross Substitutes Valuations
In the next section (Section 4.2) we give an example where there is a unique optimum, there exist
Walrasian prices over the items, and no dynamic bundle pricing scheme can guarantee an optimal
outcome.
Here, we show that in the case of Gross Substitute valuations, a unique optimum implies the
existence of static prices that guarantee an optimal allocation (for any order of arrival). Our pricing
scheme is based on a combinatorial algorithm inspired by Murota [25, 26].4
Given some set of items A Ď I, we define the sets of items local to A as following
LocalpAq “ tB ‰ A Ď I : |BzA| ď 1 and |AzB| ď 1u.
We present the following alternative definition of gross substitute valuations [13]:
Definition 4.1. A valuation v : 2I Ñ <ě0 satisfies the gross substitute condition whenever the
following holds: for every item prices p : I Ñ <ě0, for every A Ď I such that A R DpI, pq there
exists B P LocalpAq such that upB, pq ą upA, pq.
We refer to this characterization as the local improvement property (LI).
A valuation function v is submodular if for every S, T such that S Ď T Ď I, and j P I,
vpS Y tjuq ´ vpSq ě vpT Y tjuq ´ vpT q. We also use the characterization of Reijnierse et al. [28]
for gross substitutes valuations:
Definition 4.2. A valuation v : 2I Ñ <ě0 is gross substitutes if and only if v is submodular, and
for every S Ă I and b1, b2, b3 R S:
vpS Y tb1, b2uq ` vpS Y tb3uq ď maxtvpS Y tb1uq ` vpS Y tb2, b3uq, vpS Y tb2uq ` vpS Y tb1, b3uqu. (8)
4See [20] for a concise description on how Murota’s work relates to the computation of Walrasian prices for GS
valuations.
Given a set of gross-substitute valuations and items xv, Iy, let B “ tB1, . . . , Bnu be the unique
optimal allocation. We compute the prices p : I Ñ <ě0 as follows:
1. Let D “ td1, . . . , dnu be a set of dummy items (one for each agent), I 1 “ I YD be the set of
items after we added the dummy items. We extend every valuation function vi to the domain
2I
1
, where vipXq “ vipXXIq (i.e., the dummy items have no effect on the value of the bundle).
Define B1 “ tB11, . . . , B1nu where every bundle B1i “ tBiYtdiuu receives an additional dummy
item.
2. Let R “ xV “ I 1, E Ă V ˆV,W : E Ñ <y (the exchange graph) be a weighted directed graph
where:
• E “ txa, by P I 12 : a P B1i, b P I 1zB1i for every iuzD2: I.e., there is an edge from every
item in some bundle B1i to every item not in B1i, unless the two items are dummy items.
• Let e “ xa, by where a P B1i of some agent i be an edge in the graph. W peq “ vipB1iq ´
vipB1i´ a` bq, i.e., the value of the agent from bundle B1i minus the value she gets if she
exchanges item a for item b.
3. Let δ ą 0 be the weight of a minimum weight cycle in R (in the full version we show that
all the cycles in R are of strictly positive weight). Let γ ą 0 be the weight of the minimum
weight path out of all the paths from any vertex to any dummy vertex (in the full version we
show that all such paths are of strictly positive weight). Let  “ mintδ,γun`1 .
4. Update the weights by setting W peq ÐW peq ´  for every edge e in the graph.
5. Price the items using algorithm Price-Items (Figure 1) with graph R as input.
We prove the following theorem5:
Theorem 4.2. Item prices p computed above achieve optimal welfare irrespective of the order of
arrival of the buyers.
Consider the algorithm for computing prices described above.
Lemma 7. All the cycles in the graph R described in step 2 of the above price computation are of
strictly positive weight.
Proof: Let i be some agent (recall that Bi the bundle allocated to her in the unique optimal
allocation). Let δ “ minx‰BtSWpB,vq´SWpx,vqu be the difference in welfare between the optimal
allocation, and the second best allocation. δ ą 0 since the optimal allocation is unique. For some
item b P IzBi define the modified valuation vpbqi : 2I 1 Ñ <ě0 as follows:
v
pbq
i pSq “
#
vipSq ` δ b P S
vipSq b R S
. (9)
5Independently, Paes Leme and Wong [21] defined robust Walrasian pricing where there is no overlap between
the demand sets of different buyers, and showed that for Gross substitute valuations with unique optima, such prices
exist. Viewed from our perspective, this gives static prices that achieve optimal welfare for any order of arrival.
Let vpbq “ pv´i, vpbqi q. For some arbitrary allocation x ‰ B we have
SWpx,vpbqq “ vpbqi pxiq `
ÿ
j‰i
vjpxjq
ď vipxiq ` δ `
ÿ
j‰i
vjpxjq
ď SWpB,vq
“ SWpB,vpbqq,
and therefore, B is still an optimal allocation for profile vpbq. We next claim that vpbqi is gross
substitutes, by showing it satisfies the requirements in Definition 4.2.
First we show that v
pbq
i is submodular. Let S Ă T two sets of items, and let b1 be some
item. if b1 ‰ b, then we know that vpbqi pb1|Sq “ vipb1|Sq ď vipb1|T q “ vpbqi pb1|T q. Otherwise,
v
pbq
i pb1|Sq “ vipb1|Sq ` δ ď vipb1|T q ` δ “ vpbqi pb1|T q. Next, we verify (8). Let S be some set of items
and b1, b2, b3 some items not in S. Since, vi is GS, we know that (8) holds. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that vipSYtb1, b2uq`vipSYtb3uq ď vipSYtb1uq`vipSYtb2, b3uq, which is equivalent to
vipb2|SYtb1uq ď vipb2|SYtb3uq. If b2 ‰ b then vpbqi pb2|SYtb1uq “ vipb2|SYtb1uq ď vipb2|SYtb3uq “
v
pbq
i pb2|S Y tb3uq, and otherwise vpbqi pb2|S Y tb1uq “ vipb2|S Y tb1uq ` δ ď vipb2|S Y tb3uq ` δ “
v
pbq
i pb2|SYtb3uq. This implies that vpbqi pSYtb1, b2uq`vpbqi pSYtb3uq ď vpbqi pSYtb1uq`vpbqi pSYtb2, b3uq.
Since vpbq is a gross substitute valuation profile, it admits a Walrasian equilibrium pB1, pq. We
claim that pB1, pq is also a Walrasian equilibrium for v. This is true since vipB1iq “ vpbqi pB1iq, and
for every S, vipSq ď vpbqi pSq.
For some item b1 P I 1, we denote by Npb1q the function that returns the agent j for which b1 P B1j .
Consider a cycle in R that uses edge xa, by for some cycle in R. Let pb0, b1, . . . , b`´1, b0q denote the
cycle, where b0 “ a and b1 “ b. We denote b` “ b0. Since pB1, pq is a Walrasian equilibrium for
vpbq, we know that
vipB1iq ´ ppB1iq “ vpbqi pB1iq ´ ppB1iq
ě vpbqi pB1i ´ a` bq ´ ppB1i ´ a` bq
“ vipB1i ´ a` bq ` δ ´ ppB1i ´ a` bq
ą vipB1i ´ a` bq ´ ppB1i ´ a` bq.
Rearranging gives us
W pxb0, b1yq “ W pxa, byq
“ vipB1iq ´ vipB1i ´ a` bq
ą ppB1iq ´ ppB1i ´ a` bq
“ ppaq ´ ppbq
“ ppb0q ´ ppb1q. (10)
Since pB1, pq is a Walrasian equilibrium for v as well, we get that for every j P 1, . . . , `´ 1,
vNpbjqpB1Npbjqq ´ ppB1Npbjqq ě vNpbjqpB1Npbjq ´ bj ` bj`1q ´ ppB1Npbjq ´ bj ` bj`1q.
Rearranging gives us
W pxbj , bj`1yq “ vNpbjqpB1Npbjqq ´ vNpbjqpB1Npbjq ´ bj ` bj`1q
ě ppbjq ´ ppbj`1q. (11)
Summing inequality (10) with inequalities of type (11) for all j P 1, . . . , `´ 1 gives us that the
weight of the cycle pb0, b1, . . . , b`´1, b0q isÿ
jPt0,...,`´1u
W pxbj , bj`1yq ą
ÿ
jPt0,...,`´1u
pppbjq ´ ppbj`1qq “ 0.
Since agent i is an arbitrary agent and item b is an arbitrary (non-dummy) item, we get that all
the cycles in R that use an edge which ends in a non-dummy item must be strictly positive. Since
there are no edges who between two dummy items in R, we get that all cycles must use at least
one edge which ends in a non-dummy item, hence, must be strictly positive.
We now show a property which is crucial in establishing that the price of every dummy node is
zero.
Lemma 8. Let R be the graph described in step 2 of the above price computation. For every agent
i, dummy node di and every item b P I 1ztdiu, distRpb, diq ą 0.
Proof: Let di be a dummy item added to the bundle of some agent i. Let b be some item in
I 1ztdiu. For some dummy item dj ‰ di, let Rdi,dj be the graph established by taking graph R (after
step 2), and adding an edge xdi, djy of weight W pxdi, djyq “ V pB1iq ´ V pB1i ´ di ` djq “ 0. First
notice using a similar argument to the one presented in the proof of Lemma 7, it is not hard to see
that all the cycles in the graph Rdi,dj are of strictly positive weight for any choice of dj . We use
bù di and W pbù diq to denote some simple path from b to di and its weight. We now consider
the following cases:
• b is in IzBi: In this case, consider the cycle obtained by adding edge xdi, by to bù di. Since
every cycle in R is of strictly positive weight, we have that W pbù diq `W pxdi, byq ą 0.
Since W pxdi, byq “ vipBiq ´ vipBi ` bq ď 0, it must be the case where W pbù diq ą 0.
• b is some dummy item dj ‰ di: Consider the graph Rdi,dj and the cycle obtained by adding
edge xdi, djy to dj ù di. Since every cycle in Rdi,dj is of strictly positive weight, we have
W pdjù diq `W pxdi, djyq “W pdjù diq ą 0.
• b P Bi: Consider the graph Rdi,dj . Consider the cycle obtained by adding edges xdi, djy, xdj , by
to djù di. We have that the weight of the cycle is
W pbù diq `W pxdi, djyq `W pxdj , byq “W pdjù diq `W pxdj , byq ą 0.
Since W pxdj , byq “ vjpBjq ´ vjpBj ` bq ď 0, we get W pbù diq ą 0.
Since W pbù diq ą 0 for every simple path from b to di, and there are no negative cycles in R,
we have that distRpb, diq ą 0.
From Lemmas 7 and 8 and by carefully choosing  in step 4, we immediately get:
Corollary 4.3. After updating the edge weights (step 4) all the cycles in R are of strictly positive
weight, all the paths ending in a dummy vertex are of a strictly positive weight.
It is crucial that we have the following:
Corollary 4.4. For every dummy item di, ppdiq “ 0.
Proof: By the way Price-Items operates, an item di has a price greater than 0 only if there exists
a path of negative weight from some vertex to di. By Corollary 4.3, this cannot happen.
The next lemma shows that for every “local” change an agent may perform, her utility decreases.
Lemma 9. For every agent i, for every bundle C P LocalpBiq, we have upp,Biq ą upp, Cq.
Proof: Let C be some bundle in LocalpBiq. We inspect the following cases:
• AzC “ tau and CzA “ tbu: In this case, there is a directed edge in xa, by P E of weight
vipBiq´vipBi´a`bq´ “ vipBiq´vipCq´. By Lemma 3, ppCq´ppBiq ě ´vipBiq`vipCq` ą
vipCq ´ vipBiq. Rearranging gives us upp,Biq “ vipBiq ´ ppBiq ą vipCq ´ ppCq “ upp,Biq.
• AzC “ tau and CzA “ H: There is an edge between a and some dummy item dj of weight
vipBiq ´ vipBi ´ a` djq ´  “ vipBiq ´ vipBi ´ aq ´  “ vipBiq ´ vipCq ´ . Again, by Lemma
3 we get that upp,Biq ą upp,Biq.
• AzC “ H and CzA “ tbu: There is an edge between di and b of weight vipBiq ´ vipBi ´
di ` bq ´  “ vipBiq ´ vipBi ` bq ´  “ vipBiq ´ vipCq ´ . Again, by Lemma 3 we get that
upp,Biq ą upp,Biq.
The following property of gross substitute valuations shows that the above lemma is enough to
show that the prices achieve optimal social welfare.
Lemma 10. Let v : I Ñ <ě0 be a valuation that satisfies the gross substitute property, let P : I Ñ
<ě0 be some item pricing and let A be some set of items in DpI, pq. If |DpI, pq| ą 1 then there
exists some B P LocalpAq such that B P DpI, pq.
Proof: Let A be some set in DpI, pq and let us assume that |DpI, pq| ą 1 and DpI, pqXLocalpAq “
H. Let us define the following set:
Local`pp,Aq “ tB P LocalpAq : DC ‰ A P DpI, pq s.t. |B∆C| ď |A∆C|u,
that is, the set of local sets to A that are more similar to another set in DpI, pq than A is. Since
|DpI, pq| ą 1, Local`pp,Aq is non empty. Let B “ arg minXPLocal`pp,Aqtupp,Aq ´ upp,Xqu, let
C ‰ A be the set in DpI, pq such that |B∆C| ď |A∆C| and let δ “ minXPLocalpAqtupp,Aq´upp,Xqu.
δ ą 0 by our assumption. We define the following item pricing p1:
• If |BzA| “ 1, then for a P BzA set p1paq “ ppaq ´ δ{2 and p1pbq “ ppbq for all other b P I ´ a.
• Otherwise, let a be an item in AzB. Set p1paq “ ppaq ` δ{2 and p1pbq “ ppbq for all other
b P I ´ a.
Notice that C P DpI, p1q, A R DpI, p1q and DpI, p1q Ă DpI, pq. Therefore, Local`pp1, Aq Ď
Local`pp,Aq. If |BzA| “ 1 then for every set X P LocalpAq, we have that upp1, Aq “ upp,Aq ě
upp,Xq ` δ ą upp1, Xq. Otherwise, for every X P LocalpAq, upp1, Aq “ upp,Aq ´ δ{2 ě upp,Xq `
δ{2 ą upp1, Xq. Therefore, A R DpI, pq, and there is no local improvement, contradicting the LI
property of gross substitute valuations.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 4.2, we observe that by Lemma 9 for every agent i uipp,Biq ą
uipp,Xq for every X P LocalpBiq. By the LI property of vi, we have that Bi P DipI, pq. By Lemma
10 we get that DipI, pq “ tBiu.
4.2 Impossibility Result for Coverage Valuations
We show an instance with agents with coverage valuations for which no dynamic pricing scheme
guarantees an optimal allocation. Interestingly, this instance admits Walrasian prices and has a
unique optimal allocation, so no combination of these conditions is sufficient to imply optimal
dynamic pricing schemes.
Theorem 4.5. There exists an instance with agents with coverage valuations such that no dynamic
pricing scheme guarantees more than a fraction 7.58 of the optimal social welfare. This instance
admits Walrasian prices.
Proof: Let I “ ta, b, c, du be a set of items and N “ t1, 2, 3, 4u be a set of agents. Agents 2, 3
and 4 are unit demand with the following valuation functions:
v2pSq “
#
2 S X ta, bu ‰ H
0 otherwise
, v3pSq “
#
2 S X ta, cu ‰ H
0 otherwise
, v4pSq “
#
1 S X tdu ‰ H
0 otherwise
.
In addition, agent 1 has the following coverage valuation:
v1pSq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
2 S “ tbu, S “ tcu
3 S “ tau, S “ tdu
3.5 S “ ta, bu, S “ ta, cu, S “ td, bu, S “ td, cu, S “ ta, du
3.75 S “ ta, b, du, S “ ta, c, du
4 tb, cu Ď S
.
Coverage valuation: To see that this is a coverage valuation, consider the following explicit
representation. Let te1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7, e8u be the set of elements, with weights wpe1q “ wpe5q “
5{4 and wpeiq “ 1{4 for i ‰ 1, 5. Item a covers the set te1, e2, e5, e6u, item b covers the set
te1, e2, e3, e4u, item c covers the set te5, e6, e7, e8u, and item d covers the set te1, e4, e5, e8u.
Unique optimal allocation: The unique optimal allocation is to allocate item a to agent 1, item
b to agent 2, item c to agent 3 and item d to agent 4. This allocation obtains social welfare of 8.
Walrasian prices: One can easily verify that the unique optimal allocation along with pricing
each item at 1 is a Walrasian equilibrium.
We now show that no dynamic pricing scheme guarantees more than a fraction 7.58 of the optimal
allocation. In order to guarantee an optimal allocation, the following conditions must be satisfied:
• Agent 4’s utility from item d should be strictly positive; i.e.,
ppdq ă v4pdq “ 1. (12)
• Agent 1 should strictly prefer item a over item d, i.e.,
v1paq ´ ppaq ą v1pdq ´ ppdq ñ ppaq ă ppdq. (13)
• Agent 2 should strictly prefer item b over item a, i.e.,
v2pbq ´ ppbq ą v2paq ´ ppaq ñ ppbq ă ppaq. (14)
• Agent 3 should strictly prefer item c over item a, i.e.,
ppcq ă ppaq. (15)
• Agent 1 should strictly prefer item a over the bundle tb, cu, i.e.,
v1paq ´ ppaq ą v1ptb, cuq ´ ppbq ´ ppcq ñ ppbq ` ppcq ´ ppaq ą 1. (16)
Combining Equations (12) and (13) implies that ppaq ă 1, while combining Equations (14), (15)
and (16) yields ppaq ą 1. Therefore, for every prices one might set, the adversary can set an
order for which the first agent picks a different item than the one allocated to her in the optimal
allocation.
Remark: note that the valuation function of agent 1 is not gross substitutes. In particular, her
demand under prices ppaq “ ppdq “ , ppbq “ 14 `  and ppcq “ 0 is tb, cu, but if the price of item c
increases to 2, then the unique bundle in the demand of agent 1 is ta, du.
5 The Power of Bundle Prices
Recall that a bundle pricing algorithm partitions the items into bundles, B “ tB1, . . . , Bku (ŤiBi “
I), and assigns a price to every bundle in B. In this section we show how pricing bundles can help
us in getting optimal and approximately optimal welfare guarantees.
5.1 Bundle Prices for General Valuations
In this section we show that, given a partition of the items into bundles, pricing each bundle
half of its value to the buyer guarantees half of the social welfare of the partition. Let B “
tB1, B2, . . . , Bnu P
`
2I
˘n
be a partition of the items such that
Ť
iBi “ I and for every i ‰ j
Bi XBj “ H. Let W “ ři vipBiq. We have the following:
Theorem 5.1. Let p : B Ñ <ě0 be static bundle prices such that for every i, ppBiq “ vipBiq{2.
This pricing scheme achieves a welfare of at least W {2.
Proof: Let x be an allocation which is a result of agents arriving at an arbitrary order, each
taking their favorite bundles. Notice that the utility of an agent for acquiring the bundles in xi is
uipxi, P q “ vipŤBPxi Bq´řBPxi ppBq. Let Ii be an indicator which gets 1 if bundle Bi was acquired
by some agent and 0 otherwise. Rearranging and summing over all the agents gives us:
ÿ
i
vi
˜ ď
BPxi
B
¸
“
ÿ
i
˜
uipxi, P q `
ÿ
BPxi
ppBq
¸
“
ÿ
i
uipxi, P q ` IippBiq. (17)
We show that for every i, uipxi, P q ` IippBiq ě vipBiq{2. Using p17q this is enough to prove the
claim. For some i, either bundle Bi is purchased by some agent, in which case IippBiq “ vipBiq{2.
Otherwise, when agent i arrived, she could have purchased bundle Bi, for which she would have
gotten a utility of vipBiq ´ ppBiq “ vipBiq{2. Since she bought the bundles which maximized her
utility, her utility can only be greater than that, meaning uipxi, pq ě vipBiq{2.
5.2 Bundle Prices for Super-additive Valuations - New
We show that in the case where all agents have super-additive valuations, it is possible to come up
with bundles and bundle-prices such that for every arrival order of the agents, the resulting welfare
is optimal. The pricing algorithms takes a set of bundles B and an optimal allocation of bundles
to agents x : N Ñ B Y tHu (xi X xj “ H) such that the resulting welfare of the allocation isř
i vipxiq “ OPT, and outputs a possibly different allocation B1 and supporting prices p : B1 Ñ <ě0
that ensure an optimal welfare regardless of agents’ order and tie breaking.
Recall that DipB,pq returns all the sets of bundles that maximize agent i’s utility at the given
prices. Consider the process given in Figure 3.
Price-Super-Additive
Input: Supper additive valuations v1, . . . , vn, initial bundling B and optimal allocation x : N Ñ
B with welfare ři vipxiq “ OPT.
Output: Bundling B1 and pricing p1 : B1 Ñ <ě0 with welfare guarantee of OPT.
1. Initialize B1 Ð B; ppxiq Ð vipxiq for every xi ‰ H.
2. While there exists an agent i and a set S P DipB1, pq such that |S| ą 1:
(a) Let i˚ be an arbitrary such agent, and let S P argmaxTPDi˚ pB1,pq|T | (i.e., S is a set in
demand of maximum size).
(b) BS “ ŤBPS B; B1 Ð B1zS Y tBSu.
(c) Set xi˚ Ð BS ; For each i ‰ i˚ such that xi P S, set xi ÐH.
(d) Set ppBSq Ð vi˚pBSq.
3. Let  ą 0 be a sufficiently small positive number, to be determined later in this section.
For every bundle B P B1, set p1pBq Ð ppBq ´ .
Figure 3: Computing bundle prices for super-additive valuations.
The above process is guaranteed to terminate, since in every iteration of Step 2, the number of
bundles is decreased by at least 1. The next lemma ensures that after every iteration, all items are
still allocated.
Lemma 11. Consider the set S defined in Step 2a of the above process, and the allocated bundle
to i˚, xi˚, at this point. If xi˚ ‰ H, then xi˚ P S.
Proof. Assume this is not the case. By super additivity, vi˚pS Y txi˚uq ě vi˚pSq ` vi˚pxi˚q. Since
at this point, ppxi˚q is exactly vi˚pxi˚q, the utility of agent i˚ for S Y txi˚u is
vi˚pS Y txi˚uq ´
ÿ
BPS
ppBq ´ ppxi˚q ě vi˚pSq ` vi˚pxi˚q ´
ÿ
BPS
ppBq ´ vi˚pxi˚q “ vi˚pSq ´
ÿ
BPS
ppBq.
The term in the right hand side is exactly the utility of agent i˚ from the set of bundles S at this
point. This implies that S Y txi˚u grants agent i˚ at least as much utility as S, contradicting the
fact that S was the largest set of bundles in the demand of i˚ at this point.
Next, we show that the social welfare never decreases during the process.
Lemma 12. After each iteration of Step 2,
ř
i vipxiq “ OPT.
Proof. Let i˚ and S be the agent and set of bundles defined in Steps 2 and 2a of the above
process. Let NS “ ti P N : xi P Su. In order to prove the assertion of the lemma, we show that
vi˚pSq ě řiPNS vipxiq. Since the utility of each set of bundles in the demand is non-negative (the
emptyset is always feasible), it holds that
vi˚pSq ´
ÿ
BPS
ppBq “ vi˚pSq ´
ÿ
iPNS
ppxiq “ vi˚pSq ´
ÿ
iPNS
vipxiq ě 0.
By rearranging, we get vi˚pSq ě řiPNS vipxiq. That is, the welfare has not decreased by the
reallocation of bundles in S.
Lemma 13. At the end of Step 2
• For each agent i such that xi ‰ H, the only non-empty set of bundles in the demand of agent
i is the singleton bundle txiu, for which the utility is 0.
• For each agent i such that xi “ H, there is at most one non-empty set of bundles in the
demand of this agent. In the case there is one, it is a singleton bundle for which the utility
is 0.
Proof. Consider an agent i at the end of Step 2. We first notice that every non-empty set of bundles
in the demand of the agent must be a singleton bundle. Otherwise, by loop’s condition in Step 2,
this process would not have terminated. For every agent i such that xi ‰ H, since we set pipxiq to
be exactly vipxiq, the utility of the agent for xi is 0. For agent i with xi “ H, if i has a strictly
positive utility for some bundle xj of agent j ‰ i, then vipxjq ą ppxjq “ vjpxjq, and the allocation
is not optimal, in contradiction to Lemma 12. Therefore, in this case, the utility for any bundle in
the demand of agent i is 0 as well.
Next, we notice there cannot be two singletons tB1u, tB2u in the demand of agent i, since in
this case vipB1q ě ppB1q, and therefore, the utility of agent i for tB1, B2u is at least
viptB1, B2uq ´ ppB1q ´ ppB2q ě vipB1q ` vipB2q ´ ppB1q ´ ppB2q ě vipB2q ´ ppB2q,
where the first inequality follows from sub-additivity. This implies that the set tB1, B2u, must be in
the demand of agent i as well, which contradicts the fact that all sets in the demand are singleton
bundles.
Lastly, we notice that for agent i such that xi ‰ H, if there was a set tBu in the demand and
B ‰ xi, then since ppxiq “ vipxiq, the utility of i for set tB, xiu is
viptB, xiuq ´ ppBq ´ ppxiq ě vipBq ` vipxiq ´ ppBq ´ ppxiq “ vipBq ´ ppBq,
implying that tB, xiu is in the demand of agent i as well, a contradiction. This completes the proof
of the lemma.
Consider some agent i at the end of Step 2 of Price-Super-Additive. Since the utility of agent i
for the singleton bundle in the demand (if there is one) is 0 according to the above lemma, agent i
has negative utility for every other non-empty set of bundles. Therefore, for each agent i, we define
δi “ mintSĎB1:SRDipB1,pqu´uipS, pq,
where p are the prices at the end of Step 2. Roughly speaking, this indicates by how much the
utility of the agent for any set not in the demand can increase while keeping this set not in the
demand. Define the following , to be used to decrease the price of every bundle in B1 as described
in Step 3 of the above process.
 “ mini δi
n` 1 . (18)
The following theorem states that if we set prices by using Price-Super-Additive, then the resulting
welfare is optimal.
Theorem 5.2. For any setting with super-additive valuations, there exist bundling and static prices
over bundles such that for any arrival order of the agents (and any tie breaking of the agents), the
resulting allocation is optimal.
Proof. Consider some set of bundles S Ď B1 which is not in the demand of agent i at the end of
Step 2 of Price-Super-Additive. By the definition of δi, at the end of Step 2,
ř
BPS ppBq´vipSq ě δi.
Since at Step 3, each bundle’s price is decreased by  (as defined in (18)), we have that after Step
3, ÿ
BPS
p1pBq ´ vipSq ě δi ´ |S| ¨ 
“ δi ´ |S| ¨ mini δi
n` 1
ě δi ´ |S| ¨ δi
n` 1
ą δi ´ δi “ 0,
where the last inequality follows because there are at most n bundles in B1 (and therefore in S).
Therefore, the utility of agent i for every set of bundles not in his demand at the end of Step 2 is
negative, while i’s utility for the singleton bundle in i’s demand (if exists) is  ą 0.
Now consider some bundle B P B1. This bundle is the allocated bundle xi for some agent i. If
this bundle has not been taken by some agent that arrived prior to agent i, then since this bundle
grants i a utility of , while other non-empty sets of bundles will grant i a negative utility, agent i
is going to take xi, and get a value of vipxiq for it. On the other hand, if this bundle was already
taken before agent i arrived, by Lemma 13, it was taken by some agent j which had a utility of 0
for this bundle at the end of step 2. By the argument above, agent j must have only taken xi, since
every other combination grants j a negative utility. Therefore, the value agent j gets from taking
xi is vjpxiq “ ppxiq “ vipxiq. Overall, the obtained welfare is ři vipxiq “ OPT, as desired.
5.3 Bundle Prices for k-Demand Item-Dependent Valuations
Let N be a set of agents, I be a set of items. A valuation v : 2I ÞÑ <ě0 is k-demand if there exists
valuation of the items w1 : I ÞÑ <ě0 such that for any bundle B,
vpBq “ max
XĎB:|X|ďk
ÿ
bPX
w1pbq.
We say that an item valuation profile v “ tv1, . . . , vnu is item-dependent if there exists a function
w : I Ñ <ě0 such that for every agent i and every item b, vipbq P t0, wpbqu.
Finally, we say that a valuation profile is k-demand item-dependent for some vector k “
pk1, . . . , knq if v is item-dependent and for every i vi is ki-demand.
Our main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. For any vector k “ pk1, . . . , knq and for every valuation profile which is k-demand
item-dependent there exists an optimal dynamic bundle-pricing scheme.
Note that given any optimal allocation x, it is possible to construct an optimal allocation x1
such that for any agent i, the bundle Bi assigned to agent i satisfies vipBiq “ sumbPBiwpbq by
simply removing items of Bi that have non-positive marginal contribution to vipBiq. We call such
an allocation a tight allocation.
We say that a partition B0 of goods into bundles is a refinement of another partition B1 of
goods into bundles if for any two items u, v that belong to a bundle B0 P B0, there exists a bundle
B1 P B1 that contains both u and v.
Consider a tight optimal allocation x of bundles to agents. Let the relation graph induced by
x be the directed graph Rx “ pV,Eq defined as follows. For any agent i, define Bi be the set of
items assigned to agent i and create vertex si. Create an edge from vertex si to vertex sj in E if
vjpBjq “ vipBjq.
Let  ă minuPI vpuq. The algorithm at time 0, starts with a bundle for each good.
For each time t, Algorithm Price-k-Demand proceeds as described in Figure 4.
We first prove several invariants of the procedure defined in Fig. 4.
Lemma 5.4. For any time t, for any si, sj P DAGt, if there is an edge xsi, sjy P DAGt then
uipBiq ą uipBjq for the pricing pt.
Proof: Consider si, sj P DAGt such that xsi, sjy P DAGt. Let r be the rank of si in σ. Since
xsi, sjy P DAGt, the rank r1 of sj is higher than r, i.e.: r1 ą r.
We write:
uipBiq “ vipBiq ´ ptpBiq “ vipBiq ´ vipBiq ` r “ r.
Similarly,
uipBjq “ vipBjq ´ ptpBjq “ vipBjq ´ vjpBjq ` r1 . (19)
Now, recall that there is an edge xsi, sty P DAGt, and so by definition of DAGt, we have vipBjq “
vjpBjq. Replacing in Eq. (19), we have that
uipBjq “ vjpBjq ´ vjpBjq ` r1 “ r1 .
It follows that uipBiq “ r and uipBjq “ r1 . Recall r1 ą r and so uipBiq ą uipBjq.
Price-k-Demand
Input: A set of bundles Bt´1 and a set of agents Nt´1 and the valuation vi : Bt´1 Ñ <ě0 for
each agent i.
Output: A set of bundles Bt such that Bt´1 is a refinement of Bt and an assignment of prices
pt to the bundles of Bt.
1. Compute a tight optimal allocation xt of the bundles of Bt´1 to the agents of Nt´1.
2. For each set Bi of bundles assigned to agent i in xt, create the bundle Bi.
3. Construct the relation graph Rxt induced by xt.
4. Remove each edge of Rxt that takes part in at least one directed cycle of Rxt , this yields
a directed acyclic graph DAGt.
5. Apply a topological sort to DAGt. It defines an ordering σ of the bundles.
6. For any bundle Bi of rank r in σ, define ptpBiq Ð vipBiq ´ r.
7. For each bundle B that is not assigned to any agent, define ptpBq Ð 8.
8. Return tB0, . . . , Bnu and pt
Figure 4: Price-k-Demand, a dynamic pricing algorithm for the k-demand item-dependent scenario.
Define outpsiq to be the set tsj | xsi, sjy P Rxtu. Note that outpsiq is defined w.r.t. Rxt and not
DAGt. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 5.5. At any time t, the arriving agent, say ai, picks bundles in the set tBiu Y outpsiq.
Proof: We first argue that the utility of Bi for agent i is positive. By definition, we have
uipBiq ě vipBiq ´ vipBiq ` r “ r, for some r ě 1. Hence, uipBiq ą 0.
We now show that the utility of any Bj R tBiu Y outpsiq for agent i is negative. The price of
Bj is vjpBjq ´ r, for some 1 ď r ď n. Since there is no edge from si to sj in Rxt , we have that
vjpBjq ‰ vipBjq. Furthermore, observe that the allocation is tight. Hence, vjpBjq “ řbPBj wpbq
and so, since the valuation are item-dependent, vipBjq ă vjpBjq. By the choice of , it follows that
vipBjq `  ă vjpBjq. (20)
By definition of the algorithm, we have
uipBjq “ vipBjq ´ ptpBjq “ vipBjq ´ vjpBjq ` r,
for some integer r ě 1. Thus, combining with Eq. (20), we have uipBjq ă 0.
Thus, we have shown that:
• uipBiq ą 0, and
• @Bj R tBiu Y outpsiq, uipBjq ă 0.
We now argue that agent i does not pick any bundle Bj R tBiuY outpsiq. Since uipBiq ą 0, agent i
picks a set of bundles that yields positive utility – in particular the set of bundles agent i picks is
non-empty.
Finally, assume towards contradiction that this set of bundles B contains some Bj R tBiu Y
outpsiq. Consider B ´ tBju. Since the valuations are item-dependent and Bj has negative utility,
B ´ tBju has higher utility than B, a contradiction.
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 5.3] For any time t, let at be the agent that arrives at time t. Let
Bpatq be the set of bundles that agent at bought when she arrived at time t and let xAlgt denote
the allocation of the bundles defined by tpa1,Bpa1qq, . . . , pat,Bpatqqu. We say that an allocation x
extends xAlgt if for any aj P ta1, . . . , atu, we have that x assigns Bpajq to aj .
We aim at proving the following invariant.
Invariant: At any time t, there exists an optimal allocation OPTt`1 which extends xAlgt .
Note that the invariant directly implies the theorem by taking t “ n. This is true for t “ 0 as
no agent has arrived yet. We show by induction that it remains true for any time t ą 0. Consider
a time t ą 0. Let xt denote the allocation of the bundles of optimal social welfare that (1) extends
xAlgt´1 and (2) is used by Price-k-Demand to define the bundles. Such an allocation is guaranteed to
exist by the induction hypothesis.
Let at be the agent arriving at time t. For any i, let Bi be the bundle assigned to agent ai in
xt. Let Bt be the bundles picked by agent at when she arrives at time t.
We now show that there exists an optimal allocation that extends xAlgt . Note that the only
difference between xAlgt and x
Alg
t´1 is that agent at gets assigned Bt. By the definition of the algorithm,
we have utpBtq ą 0 and so, agent at picks at least one bundle, i.e.: Bt ‰ H.
We define a new allocation x˚ and show that (1) x˚ extends xAlgt and (2) x˚ has optimal social
welfare. We start from xt, i.e.: x
˚ “ xt and modify x˚ in two steps.
1. We make a first modification to xt if Bt R Bt. If Bt R Bt, we claim that there exists a bundle
Bj whose corresponding vertex sj is such that xst, sjy P Rxt and xst, sjy was removed at step
3 of Procedure 4. By Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5, we have that Bt Ď tBtuYoutpstq and if there is an
edge xst, sjy in the DAG then utpBjq ă utpBtq. Thus, there exists a directed cycle C which
contains the edge xst, sjy in Rxt .
Thus, modify x˚ by swapping the bundles along the cycle, namely: for each edge xsi, s`y,
agent ai receive bundle B`. Denote by Bj˚ the bundle assigned to agent j in this allocation.
Denote by x1˚ the allocation obtained after this modification of xt. Define fxtpBj˚ q to be the
agent to which Bi˚ was assigned to in xt.
2. Finally, obtain x˚ by modifying x1˚ (or xt if Bt P Bt) as follows: assign each bundle of Bt to
agent at and Bj˚ zBt to any other agent aj . For the other agents, the assignment remains the
same as in x1˚ .
By definition, x˚ extends xAlgt . Thus, we only need to argue that x˚ achieves an optimal social
welfare:
xt achieves optimal social welfare and for any edge xsk, s`y P C, we have that vkpB`q “ v`pB`q.
By summing over all k such that sk is a vertex of C, we obtain that SWpx1˚q “ SWpxtq.
We now show that SWpx˚q ´ SWpx1˚q ě 0. Recall that agent utpBtq ą 0, so for any bundle
Bj˚ P Bt, vtpBj˚ q ´ ptpBj˚ q ě 0 as otherwise agent at would not pick it. We thus have:ÿ
j‰t and B˚j PBt
vtpBj˚ q ě
ÿ
j‰t and B˚j PBt
ptpBj˚ q
ě
¨˝ ÿ
j‰t and B˚j PBt
vfxt pB˚j qpBj˚ q‚˛´ n ¨ 
“
¨˝ ÿ
j‰t and B˚j PBt
vjpBj˚ q‚˛´ n ¨ ,
and so, by the definition of , and since the allocation is tight,ÿ
j‰t and BjPBt
vtpBj˚ q “
ÿ
j‰t and BjPBt
vjpBj˚ q.
This corresponds to the difference in value for agent at in allocation x
˚.
Now, for any agent aj ‰ at such that Bj is in Bt, we have a difference in value in x˚ of ´vjpBj˚ q.
We combine and sum over all agents and obtain:
SWpx˚q ´ SWpxtq “
ÿ
BjPBt and j‰t
´vjpBj˚ q `
ÿ
BjPBt and j‰t
vjpBj˚ q “ 0.
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A No Static Prices for the Running Example (Figure 2)
Lemma A.1. There is no static pricing scheme for the running example that achieves optimal
welfare.
Proof: Note that in any welfare maximizing allocation for the example, all items should be
allocated. We consider pricing Let DAlice, DBob and, DCarl denote the demand sets of Alice, Bob,
and Carl, respectively, under pricing p.
Suppose that |DAlice| “ 2. Then if c R DBob Y DCarl, then DBob “ tbu and DCarl “ tau. We
consider the following sequence: Carl arrives first and takes a, Bob arrives second and takes b and
so c is not picked, a contradiction. So suppose c belongs to DBob, then we consider the following
order of arrival: Bob arrives first and takes c, Alice arrives second and takes a and so b is not
picked, a contradiction. Similarly if c P DCarl, we consider the arrival where Carl arrives first and
takes c, Alice arrives second and takes b and so at least one of a or d is not picked, a contradiction.
Symmetrically, the above argument applies to the cases where |DBob| “ 2 or |DCarl| “ 2.
Then, suppose that |DAlice|, |DBob|, |DCarl| “ 1. Suppose first that DAlice “ tau and so, DBob “
tbu and DCarl “ tcu. Then 6 ´ ppaq ą 12 ´ ppbq, 8 ´ ppbq ą 8 ´ ppcq and 10 ´ ppcq ą 4 ´ ppaq.
Combining we obtain, 6 ` ppaq ą ppcq ą ppbq ą 6 ` ppaq a contradiction. Suppose then that
DAlice “ tbu and so, DBob “ tcu and DCarl “ tdu. Then 12 ´ ppbq ą 6 ´ ppaq, 8 ´ ppcq ą 8 ´ ppbq
and 4 ´ ppaq ą 10 ´ ppcq. Combining, 6 ` ppaq ą ppbq ą ppcq ą 6 ` ppaq, a contradiction. The
assertion of the lemma follows.
